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Regulatory SPS instruments in meat trade
Simon W. Schlueter, Christine Wieck, Thomas Heckelei
Abstract
Policy makers have to choose between different potentially risk-reducing 
instruments regulating agri-food trade. Analysing the meat sector, the paper 
aims at identifying least trade distorting regulations for different policy goals 
relevant to the SPS agreement. For this purpose, a non-linear gravity model is 
estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and applied to a panel data 
set at HS 4-digit level. Regulations are distinguished by a frequency approach 
allowing to identify the least trade distorting regulation for each policy objec-
tive. The results suggest significant differences of trade impacts between types 
of sanitary regulations.
Keywords: agri-food trade, gravity model, Poisson regression.
JEL-classification: C23, F14, Q17
1 Introduction
Market failure is one important reason for agri-food trade regulations: minimizing 
trade related risks, they ensure public goods such as food safety, animal health, 
plant protection, and the protection of humans from pests or diseases. However, 
given that the implied trade effects of the chosen regulatory instruments are simi-
lar to the effects of classical trade policy instruments governing domestic market 
access, they may also be applied for other than risk reducing effects, i.e. to sup-
port domestic producers. Multilateral trade rules as in the Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary (SPS) agreement on trade in food and agricultural goods offer guidelines to 
policy makers on how to make use of regulatory instruments. The provisions of 
the SPS agreement require that regulations targeting specific national policy ob-
jectives
1 are minimal with respect to their trade effects (Art. 5.4) and not more 
trade-restrictive than required (Art. 5.6). Accordingly, Wilson and Anton (2006) 
define the most welfare efficient SPS measure as least trade distorting but protec-
tive in terms of providing the desired health and safety level. However, only lim-
1 In the SPS agreement, measures regarding the protection of human, animal or plant life, and health 
are listed as the areas in which World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries can take action 
in order to achieve their desired level of protection (Art. 2.1).2
ited knowledge exists on the specific trade impacts of different regulatory instru-
ments available to enforce desired policy goals. Furthermore, the trade impact of 
regulatory instruments is not always negative as SPS measures do not simply act 
as trade barriers to protect domestic producers: safe and healthy food, information 
transmission, increased producer efficiency, and advanced consumer confidence 
may also imply positive trade impacts. 
Gravity models at various levels of detail have been mostly used to provide 
evidence on the trade impact of regulatory measures. At the aggregate level of 
agricultural trade Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni (2008), de Frahan and Vancau-
teren (2006), Fontagné, Mimouni and Pasteels (2005), and Moenius (2004) can be 
mentioned, whereas Wilson and Otsuki (2001), and Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh 
(2001)  analyze  single  standards  or  sector-  or  product-specific  regulations. 
Moenius (2004) and Fontagné, Mimouni and Pasteels (2005) find out that a posi-
tive trade effect prevails in the manufacturing sector and for processed agricul-
tural products, while for other goods negative ones preponderate. Exports from 
developing and least developed countries are negatively affected (Disdier, Fon-
tagné and Mimouni 2008, Wilson and Otsuki 2001, Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh 
2001),  whereas  trade  within  countries  belonging  to  the  Organization  for  Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is not significantly influenced by 
regulatory measures (Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni 2008). Another body of 
literature applies partial equilibrium models in the quest for an optimal set of SPS 
measures regarding welfare impacts and risk mitigation strategies. Wilson and 
Anton (2006) build on the idea of Paarlberg and Lee’s (1998) optimal tariff which 
is accompanied by an additional tariff to mitigate the risk of pest infestation: they 
suggest an optimal set of SPS measures mitigating the risk of introducing foot-
and-mouth disease that is less trade restrictive than bans or tariffs alone. Peterson 
and Orden (2008) identify an efficient sequence of SPS measures for Mexican 
avocado imports to the US market. A trade ban is replaced by trade under a risk 
management system to reduce avocado-specific pest risks. These studies use dif-
ferent methodological approaches but have in common that they do not systemati-
cally compare the trade impacts of different regulatory instruments with equiva-
lent risk reduction effects. No information regarding optimal SPS measures is 
given identifying those that obtain both, desired national policy objectives regard-
ing a specific SPS level and at the same time minimize the negative trade effects.
In analysing the meat sector, the objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis 
that  different  regulatory  measures  imposed  to  achieve  a  desired  level  of  SPS 
health in a country have different implied trade effects. In addition, sanitary regu-
lations are identified which most adequately conform to Art. 5.4 and 5.6 of the 
SPS  Agreement  differentiated  by  classes  of  regulations  and  policy  objectives. 
Meat products are chosen because trade in meat is exposed to a wide number of 
market failures. Diseases, pandemics, meat and feed scandals in the last decade 3
have increased consumers’ and producers’ awareness of external effects associ-
ated  with  trade in  meat  products. This  motivates  policy  makers  to implement 
regulatory instruments, which may also serve protectionist purposes. 
Using  a  frequency  approach,  detailed  regulations  specific  data  on  sanitary 
regulations is manually collected and compiled for the years 1996 to 2007 from 
various international data sources. The information on these regulations is further 
differentiated by trading partner and year for each meat product line. This result in 
a very unique data set of regulatory measures that distinguishes all relevant SPS 
instruments  applied  for  the  various  purposes  in  the  meat  sector.  A  non-linear 
panel data gravity model is estimated for the ten most important meat exporters 
and importers by fixed effects Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) at 
the level of Harmonized System (HS) 4-digit data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two derives the 
applied gravity model and introduces the PPML estimator. Section three describes 
the explanatory and dependent variables and their data sources. Section four pre-
sents estimation results on the impact of different risk-reducing regulatory in-
struments and section five concludes.
2 Theory and methodology
In this application, a non-linear panel data gravity model with fixed effects is 
estimated by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (cf. Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 
Olper and Raimondi 2008). Assuming frictionless trade, perfect competition, in-
differences  of  consumers’  choices  and  specialization  of  countries  in  different 
products, the gravity model describes bilateral trade flows by a function of ex-








where  ij m  presents trade value from exporting country i  to importing country  j , 
i Y and  j Y  are exporter and importer gross domestic product (GDP), and 
w Y  pre-
sents world GDP. The simple gravity equation implies that each country exports 
its specific product everywhere. Product differentiation can either be obtained by 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory where trade is impeded and factor prices are not 
equalized as in Deardorff (1998), by Armington-like specifications assuming dif-
ferentiation by country of origin as in Anderson (1979) and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), by Ricardian elements as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), or by 
monopolistic  competition  and  increasing  returns  as  in  Helpman  (1987), 
Bergstrand (1989) and Redding and Venables (2004). Dropping the assumption of 4
frictionless trade and integrating different forms of geographic barriers to a some-
how  formulated trade  cost  factor  possibly  also  including  technical  regulations
gives the opportunity to assess the impacts of any form of tariff or non-tariff bar-
riers.
One difficulty of estimating gravity type trade models is the existence of het-
eroscedasticity which may cause inefficient and inconsistent estimates (Silva and 
Tenreyro  2006).  Heteroscedasticity  is  present  when  trade  flows  for  small  and 
remote countries may approach zero. This causes the conditional variance of the 
explained variable for small countries to tend to zero as positive dispersions form 
the conditional mean cannot be offset by negative ones contrary to large trade 
flows where the variance can be expected to be larger as the dispersion from the 
conditional mean can go in either direction. For estimating gravity models the 
least squares and nonlinear least squares estimators cannot be efficient as they 
require the conditional variance  ( ) var | m x  being constant. Also, in the presence 
of  heteroscedasticity  the  error  term  of  the  log-linearized  version  of  the  trade 
model in equation (1) can only be assumed independent from explanatory vari-
ables under very specific conditions on proportionality of the conditional vari-
ance. Consequently, all estimators of log-linear models which ignore heterosce-
dasticity are generally inconsistent (Silva and Tenreyro 2006).
Pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) estimation is able to handle inefficiencies 
and inconsistencies caused by heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, zero trade between 
particular country pairs does not create inconsistencies as in the case when the 
log-linear form of the gravity equation is used. PML can be understood as a Gen-
eral Methods of Moments estimator with moment conditions corresponding to the 
first and second order conditions of maximum likelihood. The pseudo-likelihood 
function is specified appropriately as long as it is based on a probability density 
function that is a member of the family of linear exponential functions, such as 
the normal or the Poisson probability density function (Gourieroux, Monfort and 
Trognon 1984). In employing a PPML estimator in their gravity application, Silva
and  Tenreyro  (2006)  start  with  the  conditional  expectation  of  ij m   given  x , 
| ij E m x    ,  which  is  derived  by  an utility  maximizing  model assuming  constant 
elasticity of substitution preferences (cf. Anderson 1979, and Deardorff 1998): 
( ) | exp ijt ijt ijt E m x x β   =   (2)
0 ijt m ≥  and  | 0 ijt E x ε   =   ;  ijt m  and  ijt x  are vectors of dependent and explanatory 
variables. This functional form is a good choice in modeling gravity equations, 
because  it  produces  non-negative  conditional  expectations  (as  ijt m   is  non-
negative) without constraining the explanatory variables. When  ijt m  is assumed to 
follow a Poisson distribution with expectation  ( ) exp ijt ijt x λ β = , a likelihood func-5
tion  ( ) | ijt f m x  can be derived, whose first and second order moment conditions 
can be solved to obtain the vector of coefficients  β  (Gourieroux, Monfort and 
Trognon 1984). The Poisson assumption imposes restrictions on the conditional 
moments of the explained variable: the conditional variance has to equal the con-
ditional mean  | | ijt ijt V m x m x     =Ε    . However, the first and second order conditions 
of the likelihood function rely only on the correct specification of the conditional 
mean function (2) regardless of the conditional variance of the explained variable. 
The PPML estimator is fully robust to distributional misspecifications, i.e. the 
restrictions imposed by the Poisson assumption do not destroy the consistency 
property  of  the  estimates  when  the  conditional  mean  is  correctly  specified 
(Wooldridge 1999).
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= + + + +  
  ∑ (3)
with  0 ijt m ≥  and | 0 ijt E x ε   =   , where ijt m  is the trade value from exporter  i  to 
importer  j  at time t ,  it p  and  jt c  present the annual meat production and meat 
consumption quantities of exporter  i  and importer  j  and can be interpreted as 
parameters representing a country’s economic size in this sectoral analysis,  ij d  is 
the bilateral distance between exporter and importer, i α  and  j α are exporter and 






presents k different regulatory measures which are included in varying aggrega-
tion levels, and  ijt ε  is the error. Country-specific time-invariant fixed effects  i α
and  j α  are included to capture unobserved country heterogeneity such as multi-
lateral resistance (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003).
2 Fixed effects models yield 
similar results to the case when multilateral resistance variables are included di-
rectly (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003).
2 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have impressed the idea of multilateral resistance which means
the ratio between bilateral trade barriers of two trading countries and the average trade barrier of the 
two countries with all their trading partners.6
Equation (3) can be written as an exponential function
1 2 3 4 5 exp ln ln ln ln
k
ijt it jt ij i j ij ijt k ijt ijt
k
m p c d z t r β β β α α β β β ε   = + + + + + + + +  
  ∑ (5)
which equals the functional form of equation (2). The coefficients of the exponen-
tial regression function (5) are estimated by PPML.
3 Data
All data is bilateral (exporter-importer related) for each product line and for each 
year. HS 4-digit data on trade in meat products is coming from United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Comtrade for the years 1996 
to 2007. Those ten importing
3 and ten exporting
4 countries are included in the 
analysis  which  have  the  highest  average  aggregated  meat  trade  flow  in  value 
terms over the sample period. Zero trade flows between country pairs are in-
cluded. Consumption of domestic meat is not considered. Altogether there are 
11400 n =
5 observations. 51 % of those observations are positive. Data on sani-
tary regulations is taken from the WTO SPS Information Management System 
and the International Portal on Food Safety, Animal and Plant Health (IPFSAPH) 
which is a joint undertaking between international organizations related to food 
and trade issues and SPS-recognized standard-setting organizations. This manual 
search and sampling of information on regulatory measures in the meat sector was 
necessary given that the conventional data bases for non-tariff measures such as 
the UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) does not pro-
vide  the  detailed  information  on  applied  measures  necessary  to  do  a  sector-
specific  analysis  that  distinguishes  the  different  types  of  instruments  applied. 
Regulations are arranged into six classes: (1) prevent dispersion of pests and dis-
eases, (2) microbiological testing for zoonoses, (3) maximum residua level, (4) 
processing of meat, (5) control of production, and (6) treatment and distribution. 
Table 1 shows how these classes are divided into specific regulatory instruments. 
The instruments are assigned to four risk-reducing trade policy goals which are 
defined as part of the notifications WTO members have to make when implement-
3 Observed importers: Canada, China, EU15, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea Republic of, Mexico, Rus-
sia, Saudi Arabia, USA.
4 Observed exporters: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU15, Hong Kong, New Zea-
land, Poland, USA.
5 (95 country pairs) * (12 years) * (10 HS 4-digit codes).7
ing regulatory measures: (1) food safety, (2) animal health, (3) plant protection, 
and (4) protect humans from animal/plant pest or disease.








protect humans from 




prevent dispersion of pests and diseases 4085
pest/disease status x x x 2921
quarantine x 1110
regionalization x 54
microbiological testing for zoonoses 4107
e. coli x x 1144
listeria monocytogens x x 1348
salmonella x x 1615
maximum residua level 38969
dioxin x 1986
food additives x x 4482
MRL pesticides x x x 24193
MRL drugs x x 5450
MRL other toxins x 2471
retained water content x 387
processing of meat 12054
GMO/biotechnology x x 3680
hormones x 1599
other production processes x 6775
control of production 29837
certification x x 3371
inspect., approval procedures x 9421
HACCP  x 5155
harmonization x 2113
labelling x 4247
traceability/registration x x x 1038
risk assessment x 1963
sanitary requirements for meat estab-
lishments x 2529
treatment and distribution 14709
irradiation x 3568





number of counts 102597 17624 24193 36867
Source: Own compilation
Table 1 also shows the number of counts for each class, each regulatory meas-
ure and each trade policy goal. Regulatory measures are counted the first time in 
the year of entry into force, adoption or notification (depending on data availabil-8
ity) if the date of entry into force, adoption, or notification is in the first half of the 
year; otherwise, it is assumed that the measures take effect in the following year. 
All regulatory measures within the class of microbiological testing of zoonoses, 
maximum residua level, processing of meat, control of production and treatment 
and distribution are assumed to be effective permanently from the first year of 
counting. Regulations within the class pests/diseases are assumed to be in force in 
the first year of counting and the following year allowing for the improvement of 
the countries’ disease status. Meat production and consumption quantities come 
from the statistical webpage of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
6
As Hong Kong data are not displayed, they originate from the webpage of index-
mundi.
7 Bilateral data on the explanatory variable geographic distance originates 
from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
homepage.
8 Weighted distance is chosen as distance variable where the EU15 is 
substituted by Germany. A time trend dummy variable is included. Tariff data 
stems from UNCTAD TRAINS database. If available, the bilateral effectively 
applied tariff is chosen; otherwise the most-favourite-nations tariff is incorpo-
rated.
4 Results and specification tests
Table 2 presents outcomes of two different models estimated by pseudo Poisson-
maximum likelihood. The common base of both models is the exponential regres-
sion function (5). The models differ in their insertion of regulatory measures. The 
model “aggregate” in the first column of table 2 includes one overall aggregate of 
regulatory instruments being the sum of all counts for a particular country-pair 
and a tariff line within one year. The model “classes” in the second column of 
table 2 includes six predefined classes of regulatory measures. The models are 
tested on the set of conditioning variables and on the functional form. T-tests, 
Wald-tests and an extension of Ramsey’s Regression Equation Specification Error 
Test (RESET) are carried out by using standard errors which are robust to distri-






Table2. Outcomes of the models “aggregate” and “classes”













aggregate of regulatory measures 0.015*** -
prevent dispersion of pest/disease



























The Wald-test rejects the hypothesis that the conditional mean is independent 
of  the  explanatory  variables  for  both  models.  The  heteroscedasticity-robust 
RESET checks the correct specification of the conditional mean expectation by 
testing the significance of two additional explanatory variables ( )
2 ˆ xβ and ( )
3 ˆ xβ : 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 3
1 2 exp m x x x β δ β δ β = + + (6)
(Silva and Tenreyro 2006, Wooldridge 1999). Under the null hypothesis, the addi-
tional regressors do not help to explain  ijt m , thus  1 δ  and  2 δ  are zero. The test 
suggests that the models aggregate, classes, and policy goals are correctly speci-
fied, whereas the model regulatory instruments fails passing the test. 
The outcomes of the four traditional gravity explanatory variables economic 
size of exporter and importer, tariff and geographic distance are similar in both
models and are all significant at the 1% significance level. The signs of the co-
variates economic size and geographic distance are as expected: distance nega-
tively affects trade, while the economic size fosters trade flows. The tariff esti-
mate is slightly positive: the coefficient’s estimate of  ( ) exp 0.01 1.01 ≈  suggests
a minor influence of tariffs on today’s meat trade. The first column of table 2 
reports additionally the estimate for the aggregate variable. The estimate’s inter-10
pretation of  ( ) exp 0.015 1.015 ≈  affirms the dual impact of regulatory measures 
on trade: regulations may be trade restricting, trade providing or may have no 
trade impact at all – a strong tendency cannot be made out from the result of the 
aggregate variable. The more disaggregated classes’ model in column 2 gives first 
evidence on the differing implied trade effects of regulatory measures. Five of the 
six estimates are significant. Whereas the classes containing measures regulating 
the prevention of pests and diseases, the maximum level of residua, and the con-
trol of production are trade promoting, the meat processing and the treatment and 
distribution classes’ trade impact is negative.
5 Conclusion
Using a non-linear panel data gravity model, this paper analyses the trade effects 
of different regulatory measures that are imposed in the meat sector in order to 
achieve a desired level of SPS health in a country. We use a new and unique data 
set given that the applied national regulatory instruments are sampled from infor-
mation provided by WTO and SPS-standard setting international organizations 
and are grouped according to the SPS areas they apply to and according to the 
political objectives they serve. The disaggregated analysis of the trade effects of 
regulatory instruments reveals the theoretically well-known ambiguous trade im-
pact of many of these measures: at the class level we find that pest/disease pre-
vention, microbiological testing for zoonoses, setting of residual levels, and con-
trol of production lead to positive impacts on trade flows whereas processing re-
strictions and treatment and distribution requirements have the opposite effects. 
These results contrast with the findings of recent research by Disdier, Fontagné 
and Mimouni (2008) who estimate a strong negative impact of SPS and TBT 
measures on meat trade using a log-linear fixed effects gravity model with HS-2 
digit data. Apart from the differences in the level of detail and disaggregation of 
the two studies, further reasons in the differences of the findings may lie in the 
fact that Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni (2008) do not handle the methodological 
challenges resulted to heteroscedasticity and that they base their estimation on a 
less sophisticated data set of SPS measures.
Limitations that apply to this paper result from the fact that a frequency count 
is used to characterize the importance of the measures. This does not allow com-
paring the food safety level achieved by a specific measure to the trade restriction 
that it imposes. A comparison of the measures in the sense of the SPS agreement, 
i.e. in terms of how they achieve a specific national safety level while minimizing 
the trade impact, is not possible with a frequency count. For this, more theoretical 
work on how to compare and quantify the potential food safety levels (or food 
safety risk reductions) that are achievable with single measures or sets of meas-
ures is necessary. 11
To conclude, the sampling of a detailed data set on regulatory measures in an 
important food sector contributes to the knowledge base of trade impacts of SPS 
measures and may provide the ground to further analyze the potential food safety 
improvements possible relative to the trade impacts implied by specific measures.
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